Why Legal Reasoning Is Important in Judicial Matter

However, a closer look at the current procedure in the precedents will show that it is not entirely correct to categorize precedents as a form of deductive reasoning. The impact of the HRA on the judicial-executive interface has already been discussed in version 2.5, but this legislation has only increased the potential for conflict in a relationship that was already subject to some tension following judicial review. Although the interface between the judiciary and the executive is now the most clearly defined in human rights actions, the past and ongoing role of judicial oversight in this relationship should not be underestimated. This position implies that the law is only a mechanism to solve certain problems and that judges should work in such a way as to ensure the best possible outcome, even if it means ignoring previously established legislation. The concept of procedural ultra vires, as its name suggests, refers to the failure of a person or entity vested with a specific power to comply with the procedure provided for the exercise of that power. It also applies to cases where a body exercising a judicial function fails to meet the requirements of natural justice by acting as counsel and judge in the same case or by not allowing the accused to make submissions to the panel deciding the case. In summary, however, it is not claimed that legal reasoning does not use logic, but it cannot be said that it is only a matter of logic. Perhaps the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the legal reasoning as exercised by the judiciary is an amalgam; Partly deductive, partly inductive, partly analogous, with an additional mixture of personal intuition, not to say personal prejudices. The acceptance of the law and the tendency to work within the existing legal framework are inherent in legal reasoning. It is true that there is a tendency to maintain the existing rules. Nevertheless, bias does not presuppose the law because it is fair, equitable or practical and therefore immune to change.

Law is considered a discipline in which you are either an expert because you studied law or completely ignorant because you did not. Of course, children and young adults learn what rules to follow – and they discover which laws they have to protest against. However, this is not the kind of legal education that will produce engaged citizens. Students should learn how the legal process works and the skills of legal reasoning, just as they learn other comprehension and reasoning skills in school. Difficult cases are decided on the basis of the judicial response to the immediate facts. However, such a situation is manifestly contrary to the declaratory legal theory. When it comes to thinking in general, there is a separation between deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning can be partly categorized as reasoning of the whole; from the general to the particular. Deductive thought finds its simplest but most powerful expression in the Aristotelian syllogism. The syllogism takes the following form: There is a long-standing controversy about the relationship between law and logic and the extent to which legal decisions are the result and limited by logical processes.

Sometimes lawyers have tried to dismiss what is seen as an inherent rigidity of logical thinking in favor of flexibility and discretion. As Oliver Wendel Holmes, a distinguished jurist and advocate of legal realism, said of the United States Supreme Court: „The life of law was not logical, it was experience” (The Common Law (1881)). Legal reasoning shows why and how the court, lawyer or judge came to his or her decision or reasoning in the case. (For those with a particular interest in the possibility of developing computer models of judicial reasoning and decision-making, see Allen, Aikenhead, and Widdison, „Computer Simulation of Judicial Behaviour,” webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/issue3/allen3.html.) Instead of being presented as the opinion of a particular person, the text of the law is usually expressed in the language of objectivity. The use of terms such as „thus”, „because”, „for the reason that”, „despite” indicates the voice of necessity, not the voice of choice. When combined with the use of terms such as „therefore” or „logically”, the impression is reinforced that the judge is simply concerned with elaborating and presenting the formal functioning of the objective system, the law. In this way, the language of seemingly objective and logically defined legal categories turns out to be a mere rhetorical artifice used by judges to justify the pseudo-objectivity of their respective decisions. This process is completed by the use of axioms; Undisputed and seemingly indisputable obvious truths that the judiciary often resorts to to confirm its own assumptions and assumptions without justifying them.

One should be wary of reading judges who refer to principles that are „so fundamental that they do not need to be discussed” or when conclusions follow „naturally” on the basis of a „well-established principle”. The question is whether such allegations merely invoke unconfirmed precedents and unfounded prejudices. Verdicts and judicial presentations to jurors are therefore not just legal statements; They are equally, if not fundamentally, rhetorical exercises. To read a judgment in this way is to see it in a revealing new light that shows the justifying, if not manipulative, use of language and linguistic means that are an essential element of judgment. However, it should be noted that the nature and use of rhetoric has changed over time. The difference between how rhetoric works in antiquity and its use by the judiciary today is that, whereas in antiquity it was used as a means of convincing an audience to make a particular decision, its current role is to justify the decision made by the judge. The judge speaks, the audience listens and is convinced: the role of the audience as participants has been removed and exists only as a passive addressee of the court`s decision. Legal art is an art of interpretation; This is not necessary or scientific logic, but probable arguments, evaluative thinking, not absolute certainty.

Rhetoric is the discipline that most explicitly examines relevant techniques for presenting and evaluating, confirming or refuting such likely arguments. Rhetoric is defined here as the reading of legal texts as an act of communication, as a discourse designed to influence, persuade and inspire action. Equally important is a second category of basic reasoning – deductive logic, especially the deductive forms of argument known as „syllogisms.” These are the classic forms of the deductive argument, which consist of a main premise, a secondary premise, and a conclusion. It was this aspect of logic that provoked such virulent opposition to formalism a century ago. And it is this aspect of logic that has been so downplayed throughout the twentieth century. Yet even a rudimentary understanding of deductive logic gives lawyers, judges, and law students a valuable tool for determining whether an argument in a legal opinion or brief is valid or misleading. At first sight, the application of the rules of case-law seems to imply a deductive logic close to that of written law: the court merely applies the legal principle established in the case-law to the facts of the present case in order to determine the outcome of the dispute. Therefore, as an added benefit, people will be less inclined to fall into the trap of rhetorical arguments that trigger an emotional response without offering a clear vision of what should be done and how it can be done effectively.

Just as the scientific community advocates for science education so that people can make valid arguments about vaccination and climate change, we hope that good legal education will reduce the spread of the bad legal and political arguments that currently permeate social and political discourse. The increase in the number of applications for judicial review before the HRA was truly frightening, as individuals and judges recognized its potential usefulness as a means of challenging administrative decisions. The records show that in 1980 there were only 525 applications for judicial review; 1996 4.586; 4,636 such requests in 1997; And by 1998, applications had surpassed the 5,000 mark and were continuing to rise. It can be seen that the veracity of the conclusion depends entirely on the accuracy of the analogy. The relationship between the two objects being compared depends on the weighting and evaluation of their similarities and differences.